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Some time ago we wrote on the issues surrounding the issues and problems that might be 
encountered in the prospect of undertaking a further (“second”) referendum on the 
decision of the UK to leave the EU on March 29th 2019. 
Since the vote of the 23rd June 2016, much has happened in terms of political developments 
within the UK. Notably, the Government lost its Parliamentary majority in the election of 
2017 and subsequently has relied on the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland to 
maintain power. 
However, at the same time, a growing chorus of opinion has been that of calls for another 
referendum, or “People’s Vote” on the decision to leave the EU. We have argued elsewhere 
about the practical difficulties of doing so (see here). 
However, the seeming impasse over the Government’s handling of negotiations with its EU 
opposite numbers, so vividly displayed in EU leaders’ reaction to the Prime Minister’s 
“Chequers Proposals” at the recent Salzburg summit, have only further pushed the notion of 
another vote as the only way out. 
Whilst holding a second plebiscite has long been the policy of the smaller Liberal Democrat 
party there has been a concerted push by members of the Official Opposition Labour Party 
to try and force the party leadership to adopt a similar policy on a second referendum. 
Whilst Jeremy Corbyn has explicitly stated that he is “bound by the democracy of our 
party”[1], it now appears that the party leadership have largely managed to steer the terms 
of the debate, moving away from an explicit call for a second vote.  As such, the motion that 
Labour will vote on at their upcoming conference is: 
“If we cannot get a general election, Labour must support all options remaining on the table, 
including campaigning for a public vote.” 
As can be seen, this is relatively non-committal, first in that it explicitly prioritises the 
preferred Labour Party approach (at least as encapsulated by Jeremy Corbyn and John 
McDonnell) – namely to force the Government into an election, and thereby for each party 
to spell out its offerings to the electorate in terms of a Brexit “deal”. Only in the event that 
this cannot be achieved does the second clause become operative. Moreover, even in this 
case the stated policy is merely that all options should remain open. It does not commit the 
party to supporting a public vote, merely to not opposing one. 
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Finally, even if a new referendum were to be pursued after failing to secure a new election, 
no part of this statement commits Labour to a particular set of policy choices to be 
stipulated on such a vote.  Shadow chancellor John McDonnell has stated that he does not 
believe that such a vote should include the option of remaining in the EU[2], although other 
senior figures are less keen on ruling it out (notably including Keir Starmer)[1]. 
At this point we thought we would take a look at what Labour’s current policy is towards 
membership of a customs union or staying in the Single Market, and hence try to ascertain 
whether their approach would be more likely to deliver a “good deal” for the UK than that 
of Mrs. May. 
Current Labour policy on Brexit, as stated in their 2017 manifesto (which still appears 
valid)[3] is that: “[w]e will scrap the Conservatives’ Brexit White Paper and replace it with 
fresh negotiating priorities that have a strong emphasis on retaining the benefits of the 
Single Market and the Customs Union”. 
However, on the details, the Party’s approach seems to differ little from the Government, 
for example, on “securing continued EU market access” for UK farmers, or that “[a]s our 
trading relationship with the EU changes it is vital that we retain unrestricted access for our 
goods and services”. 
These all sound commensurate with continued EEA membership, although the Party’s 
manifesto also appears to commit it to remaining outside key elements of this, stating that 
“will ensure all future trade deals safeguard the right to regulate in the public interest and to 
protect public services”. 
The most notable policy divergence from the governing Conservative Party regarding Brexit 
is regarding entering a customs union with the EU, which is now official Labour Party 
policy.  However, pronouncements from senior Labour figures have implied that Labour 
would only agree to a customs union with the EU if it could ensure that the UK “has a say” in 
the creation of future trade deals. Indeed, Corbyn has stated that: 
“A new customs arrangement would depend on Britain being able to negotiate agreement of 
new trade deals in our national interest. 
Labour would not countenance a deal that left Britain as a passive recipient of rules decided 
elsewhere by others. That would mean ending up as mere rule takers.”[4] 
In key respects then, Labour’s overall approach to Brexit shares many similarities with the 
Chequers Proposals slated by EU leaders, and would run into the same difficulties in trying 
to secure a successful withdrawal agreement from the EU. 
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The only difference seems to be in that having been in Opposition, should they find 
themselves in Government on the back of a successful election campaign, they would have 
strong grounds to “restart” the Article 50 negotiations clock, as Keir Starmer put it. In this, 
they would be likely to be granted an extension by the EU. 
Labour’s stance on regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, 
thereby preserving the GFA and the “all-Ireland” economy, would also be far less likely to be 
influenced by the DUP. it would also increase the likelihood of a referendum on North-South 
reunification in Ireland. 
In this regard, Labour’s approach to Northern Ireland would in all likelihood guarantee a 
status quo ante period of continued customs union and EEA membership during a Transition 
period after the formal withdrawal date. 
However, in terms of their overall approach to negotiating a new economic relationship 
with the EU, it is hard to see them securing any bespoke arrangement – and that the current 
“deal” scenarios of EEA membership, or a Canada-type free trade agreement – would 
continue to be the only ones on offer. 
Unless of course, the Labour party position evolves further to not in effect leaving the EU at 
all – something a clear majority of its members desire. 
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